Strategic Posture Review: Russia (World Politics Review Strategic Posture Reviews)
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Q: Is it important for the U.
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Is this reflected in the fact the report does not recommend any new systems? The U. No one benefited from this. Ultimately, we won the Cold War, but it created a world that was extraordinarily dangerous. This is a clearly undesirable thing. The United States is trying to signal to Moscow and China we do not want to go down that road again. Businesses play a huge part in this. First of all, the national innovation system of the United States is fundamentally changing because of Defense Department dollars, and the same is true in China with their defense department.
We saw this in the Cold War with satellites, most of which were presented to the public as peaceful attempt to predict weather. But these, as we all know now, had many military implications.
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The investments in big data that are used every time you use the GPS in your car—all of that came out of Defense Department money. So what businesses need to know about this is that the Pentagon is the mother of all venture capital companies. A lot of the smartest companies are carefully tracking NSA and DOD investments for new technologies for commercial purposes. Now, a different impact on business—I would say the most fascinating one to me and one I teach here—is, how do we make good decisions about technology? Which areas to invest in, which areas not to invest in.
How do we think about the subject of technology management and technology leadership? One of the biggest gaps in American business education is technology management. I think we need to develop a lot more case studies of how technology develops and technology management. We need to think about ways of looking at the future. In the Department of Defense, they talk about leaders who will make the hard choices, even if it affects them negatively in political or economic terms.
Let me describe a different way of looking at technology and leadership, and that is, are these the choices that I have really in the first place?
Spend a lot more time asking yourself, are these really the alternatives? Today a U.
Another important area is the national security implications of these high tech companies like Tencent or Alibaba in China, or their counterparts here in the United States. A better way may be to take the engineers, and have them work for you in Singapore. Or, just send the information they gather back to Beijing, all perfectly legal today.
In many ways the multinational companies are between a rock and a hard place, because if they give away sensitive information in China, they have all kinds of problems in the United States. We just happen to be the biggest market in the world, with many of the best artificial intelligence engineers and quantum computing experts. Q: With these companies that are operating in so many countries, does that have any impact on how the Pentagon is able to do its job?
Are they exerting an influence on foreign policy? One could try to get the United States government to change something in a foreign country. But the tradition in the United States is that we will not do that. China has a very different tradition.
It is just learning this game, but in China, they really will and have lobbied Congress below the radar to get changes in some of our laws. There is also a case for keeping Search and Rescue under naval control as these assets can be used for ship inspections while providing the naval aircrew with active shore jobs when not at sea. The Harrier GR9 force, since the decision to get rid of the Sea Harrier FA2, the — only aircraft currently able to be used on both the existing CVS aircraft carriers and the new Queen Elizabeth class — is also to be eliminated.
This will leave Britain without any form of maritime air power for air defence or power projection until Expert estimates are that it will take considerably longer — possibly to — to rebuild a naval or maritime fast jet force due to the fact that the current aircrew and support staff are not likely to remain in the Service following the disappearance of the Harrier force. The carriers could be in service by but it seems that political expediency, rather than sound procurement and strategic decisions, carries the risk that the delays will further inflate the cost of the project.
It is not necessary to delay the aircraft carriers until the F35C becomes available in current estimates suggest the F35C will enter US Navy service about , contradicting the logic of the SDSR report. At the same time, to argue that the government "cannot foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of strike capability previously planned"  is so disingenuous as to be deliberately misleading. Any operation that takes place outside the reach of RAF aircraft based in Britain will require a properly equipped aircraft carrier on hand.autodiscover.cmnv.org/lo-que-se-aprende-en.php
The strategic defence and security review and the national security strategy
Until , where there is no guaranteed land-based air superiority, the Amphibious Force could not be used at an acceptable risk. In the same vein, it would seem imperative that both aircraft carriers are retained, albeit with one in refit or extended readiness; to sell the second vessel would again undermine the capability of the Amphibious Forces.
As an example, if the runway at RAF Mount Pleasant in the Falklands was rendered unusable, reinforcement by air would be impossible and the establishment of air superiority could only be achieved by carrier-borne fixed wing aircraft.
Furthermore, if positioned as off an area of interest, an aircraft carrier has the potential to offer much higher sortie rates and time on task for its aircraft, giving vital additional close air support for land forces, than more distant land based aircraft operating from major bases such as Ascension Island or Diego Garcia — if the USA permits operations from these airfields. An aircraft carrier can also ensure that the maximum available force is deployed at the minimum cost.
By being able to position itself close to the scene rather than rely on distant fixed airbases, the cost in resources and the logistics footprint of a carrier based operation can be substantially less than a land based one. As the aircraft from a carrier would have shorter transit times than more distant land based air assets, not only will the sortie rate be higher for a given force level, but the costs in terms of fuel will be lower and there will not be a requirement for separate land based air to air refuelling assets which would further increase the logistics and personnel requirements as well as the financial cost.
In the case of conventional naval aircraft like the F18 or F35C, buddy-buddy air to air refuelling is also possible, vastly increasing the range of the carrier strike — and its ability to deter, coerce and strike — without the provision of additional air assets.
As the USN is demonstrating with the its carrier-based close air support for NATO forces in Afghanistan, the strike carrier adds a significant force multiplier to the tool kit available to the Commander on the scene and politicians at home. Previously, this was a brigade level formation with supporting arms and units. Under SDSR, this has been reduced to being able to land and support only 1, men — a commando battlegroup and supporting units. It is noticeable that the size of formation to be generated from Army resources is a brigade — both the so-called multi-role brigades and 16 Air Assault Brigade.
The decision to reject a strategically mobile and flexible amphibious brigade in favour of a less strategically mobile air assault brigade is, again, not in keeping with the aspirations of the SDSR report. In some respects, although the placing of an LPD in extended readiness will have a profoundly negative effect on the flexibility and rapidity of response available to the Government in fields from disaster relief to high intensity operations, it will be a return to the situation in the s and s when only one out of two of the previous generation of LPDs was immediately available for any operation or exercise.
More serious in terms of amphibious capability is the plan to dispose of one of the new Bay class LSD A s. It should also be remembered that the actual military lift required from the Bay Class project demanded five vessels. HMS Ocean is a purpose-built amphibious ship: it has passageways, ladders, accommodation, and dining spaces that are designed to cope with supporting and moving large numbers of troops to their assault stations. HMS Illustrious does not. Until the difference between a ship designed for amphibious assault and one that is not is seen, it is hard to appreciate the enormous difference in operational effectiveness that these design features facilitate.
If two vessels were built, it would ensure that a commando carrier — unlike at present — will always be available to support HMG policy.
Of the 7 boats, only 2. This situation will lead to further overstretch and generate heavy pressure on trained personnel who are already in short supply and in danger of approaching critical mass. The reduction in surface ship numbers throws into question the ability of the Royal Navy to cover the range of commitments it currently has to meet. Quite simply, one warship cannot be in two places at once. At the same time, the ability of the RN to generate sufficient naval power to protect and support either an amphibious task group or a strike aircraft carrier task group from such low numbers of surface ships is questionable.
Furthermore, the presence of RN Frigates and Destroyers operating around the world provides a potential rapid response to disasters and crises, as well as supporting defence diplomacy. This represents yet another significant loss of operational flexibility. Of the 6 destroyers and 13 frigates remaining after the SDSR cuts, 2 destroyers and 4.